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The writer is a military analyst and author of the forthcoming book ‘How the United States Would Fight China’
European leaders were not at the table when US President Donald Trump met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Alaska on Friday. But the summit could potentially have major consequences for the future security of their continent. Europe’s leaders must decide how far they will go to ensure that Ukraine remains an independent nation.
Having travelled to the frontline in Donbas last month, I can attest to the bravery of Ukrainian soldiers and noticeable signs of exhaustion. The country’s forces continue to suffer from a manpower deficit, and while the front is mostly holding for now, with a collapse unlikely, Kyiv risks losing its advantage in drone warfare — the pivotal element in Ukraine’s defensive system — due to Moscow’s superior organisation and ability to scale up drone operations.
A recent tactical breakthrough by Russian forces in southern Donetsk could herald a more fluid frontline and further Ukrainian territorial losses. Europe’s hour of reckoning may be approaching faster than the public realises. If leaders decide that preserving an independent pro-western Ukraine serves Europe’s core interests, the first-order question becomes: what are they willing to do to maintain a ceasefire and defend Ukraine’s sovereignty?
In the 1991 comedy King Ralph, a hapless Las Vegas entertainer finds himself unexpectedly crowned the British monarch. When discussing international crises with the prime minister, King Ralph observes: “There’s no problem that can’t be ignored if we really put our minds to it.” This statement captures perfectly Europe’s fundamental problem when making tough decisions about war and peace: the refusal to ask simple first-order questions and the tendency to ignore them entirely.
European leaders have mastered strategic ignorance. When it comes to plans to deploy European forces to Ukraine following a potential ceasefire, the so-called coalition of the willing has still not answered the basic questions necessary for such an endeavour to succeed: what exactly are we trying to achieve by potentially sending thousands of troops, and what are we prepared to risk to achieve these objectives? In deterrence theory, credibility is the most important currency — and any European action in Ukraine that avoids crucial questions about objectives and acceptable risks will lack credibility, inviting the very confrontation it seeks to prevent.
Sure, there are bullet points outlining what a multinational force would accomplish: deploy logistics, armament and training experts to help reconstitute Ukraine’s land forces; provide air policing alongside Ukraine’s air force and specialist mine-clearance teams. The coalition is also establishing a permanent headquarters in Paris and a co-ordination cell, while military planners from European countries work out deployment details with an agreed command structure. The ultimate aim is to turn Ukraine into a porcupine by heavily arming it.
All of this sounds reasonable, but will it deter future Russian aggression and avoid a follow-on war? The answer is probably not. That’s because this approach smacks of an exercise to guarantee continued US engagement in Ukraine rather than actively deter Russia in the near future. Building up Ukraine’s military capabilities will take time — time that Russia could use to test the coalition, which could spell disaster for European countries.
The plan reveals a simple truth acknowledged behind closed doors: there is simply no appetite among European countries to risk war with Russia beyond rhetoric. If Moscow decides to test the coalition of the willing, it could quickly transform into a coalition of the unwilling. EU leaders have done a poor job communicating to their citizens what role Ukraine plays in upholding Europe’s security, why it matters and why Europe might need to risk direct military confrontation with Russia over it. This failure stems partly from fears of a populist backlash, as Russian information warfare campaigns exploit domestic divisions on the Ukraine question across Europe. But it also reflects leaders’ own uncertainty about whether the risk is truly worth taking.
Whatever the fallout from Alaska, Europeans need to make it clear to Russia that they mean business, which means deploying or threatening to deploy combat formations to Ukraine. Unlike logistics and training missions, mechanised brigades would force Moscow to calculate whether testing European resolve is worth potentially triggering direct military confrontation with major Nato powers. Forward deploying and immediately beginning joint training exercises in Germany and Poland with brigades designated for Ukraine would send a clear signal. Following any potential ceasefire, these could deploy to Ukraine at key positions behind the frontline in the event of Russian troop build-ups and renewed aggression.
But this approach requires getting clear answers to the first-order questions that European leaders have so skilfully avoided. Europe has spent too long whispering advice from the sidelines while avoiding the fundamental question of what it is truly prepared to risk for Ukraine’s independence.
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